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Summary box
 ► Since 2013, Kenya's public health sector has been 
affected by frequent short strikes, culminating in na-
tionwide strikes lasting a total of 250 days by doc-
tors and nurses in a span of 11 months in 2016/17.
 ► Health professionals have the right to go on strike, 
but their strikes crippled health services with almost 
no public hospital inpatient services being provided, 
thus violating people’s right to healthcare.
 ► To avoid similar instances in the future, mechanisms 
should be established for dispute resolution, antic-
ipating and pre-empting changes within the health 
system that result to conflict between parties.
 ► There are no ‘magic bullets’ to avert all problems 
due to these strikes in what are complex, politically 
managed and highly professionalised health-sector 
organisations.
 ► Reactive solutions such as sacking striking workers, 
jailing trade union officials neither address the un-
derlying problems nor build resilience of the health 
system.
InTroduCTIon
Since devolution of healthcare services in 
2013, the Kenyan public health sector has 
been affected by frequent short and often 
localised strikes.1 These were followed by 
a public-sector nationwide doctors’ strike 
lasting 100 days (from 5 December 2016 to 
14 March 2017) and then the nurses’ strike 
lasting 150 days (from 5 June to 1 November 
2017), a total of 250 strike days in a span of 
11 months, referred to hereafter as the 2017 
strikes. The strikes resulted from a complex 
chain of events briefly outlined below.
A new 2010 Kenya Constitution gave every 
worker (with some exceptions for disci-
plined armed forces) the rights to join a 
union, engage in collective bargaining and 
the freedom to strike, linked to supporting 
rights to fair remuneration and reasonable 
working conditions.2 This constitution also 
devolved all primary and secondary health 
services to 47 new semiautonomous county 
governments. Initial plans were to progres-
sively transfer functions over a 3-year transi-
tion period from 2013.2
However, political pressures resulted in 
devolution of health services occurring over 6 
months to counties that had limited capacity 
in human resource for health (HRH) and 
medical supplies management. Salary delays 
and challenges managing career progres-
sion agreements and postgraduate training 
schemes, long stock-outs of essential medi-
cines and discrimination against persons 
perceived to be outsiders were reported from 
some counties in the 3 years preceding the 
2017 strikes.1 During this period, doctors and 
nurses formed trade unions.3 4 The doctors 
negotiated collective bargaining agreements 
(CBA) on pay and working conditions, 
which was reportedly signed by the national 
government in 2013 but not implemented 
and county governments did not then accept 
responsibility for it.5 Both the national and 
county government are reported to have failed 
to sign the draft nurses’ CBA that encouraged 
them to return to work after a 2-week strike 
in December 2016 resulting in the prolonged 
2017 nurses’ strike. Table 1 summarises the 
events that led to the 2017 strikes.
THe ConSequenCeS of THe STrIkeS on 
HoSpITal admISSIonS
Data from 13 county public hospitals that 
provide first-referral care illustrate the effects 
of the 2017 strikes. These hospitals are part of 
the Clinical Information Network (CIN) since 
2013/2014 whose aim is to improve quality 
and utilisation of hospital data. While they 
are not a nationally representative sample 
of hospitals, we believe their data reasonably 
mirror the pattern of hospital admissions in 
other county hospitals (they are described in 
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Table 1 Occurrence of events that led to the doctors’ and nurses’ strikes in Kenyan public hospitals
Year Events What the event entailed Implications
2010 The promulgation of the 
2010 constitution2
 ► Kenya adopted a rights-based approach 
and devolved the responsibility of public 
health service delivery of primary and 
secondary health services to 47 counties.
 ► Establishment of counties’ structures, 
capacity building and transition planned 
to take 5 years.2
 ► The constitution (Article 41) gave all types of 
workers (except disciplined armed forces) the right 
to: (1) fair remuneration, (2) reasonable working 
conditions, (3) form, join or participate in the 
activities and programmes of a trade union and (4) 
go on strike.
 ► Every trade union was given the right to engage in 
collective bargaining2
2011–2012 Doctors’ Union formed3  ► Doctors’ Union called for a strike citing 
poor working conditions and poor wages.
 ► Musyimi Task Force formed (six 
government officers and six Union 
members) to address health sector issues 
raised by the Union.15
 ► Strike lasted a few days
 ► Musyimi Task Force agreed on Return to Work 
Formula including formulation of a CBA and a 
proposal to establish Health Service Commission 
to manage service delivery.15
2013 A CBA drafted by 
Doctors’ Union and 
Ministry of Health and 
reportedly signed by both 
parties
 ► CBA aimed at aligning remuneration 
of doctors with the labour market by 
demanding a 300% pay rise to all 
medical practitioners and compensation 
if working>40 hours per week, review of 
job groups, promotions, deployment and 
recruitment of more doctors.
 ► The county governments were not signatory to the 
CBA and they felt negotiation should have been 
with each county government,5
 ► The national government did not submit the CBA 
to the industrial court for registration.
2013 New government 
formed following general 
elections
 ► Devolution of healthcare launched 
officially.
 ► June 2013, all county level functions 
speedily transferred to the counties in 
response to demand by the newly elected 
county governors.
 ► Some counties lacked structures and capacity 
to take the new roles in management of human 
resource for health and medical supplies resulting 
in delayed salary processing and stock out of 
essential medicines.1
 ► A nation-wide health professionals strike in late 
2013.
 ► The strike called off after several weeks when the 
striking health professionals were sacked.1
2013 Registrar of Trade Unions 
directed by the court to 
register nurses’ union4
 ► Nurses’ Union formed  ► The Union negotiated a 25%–40% pay raise, 
improvement of all its members working conditions 
and the absorption of all its members into 
permanent and pensionable schemes.
5 December 
2016 to 15 
March 2017
Doctors’ nation-wide 
strike in demand of 
fulfilment of the 2013 
CBA
 ► The strike affected all public hospitals 
under national and county governments 
(including the tertiary and university 
teaching hospitals).
 ► Several attempts by the employer and doctors to 
negotiate made but marked with power games, 
mistrust, miscommunication, jailing of union 
officials and political interference.5







 ► A duty resumption agreement signed on 
14 December 2016 between the national 
and the county government and nurses’ 
union to end the strike.8
 ► Award of specified allowances agreed on.8
 ► Salary issues were to be addressed in a 
comprehensive CBA.





 ► Strike attributed to failure of the national 
and county governments to sign a CBA 
on pay and working conditions.8
 ► County Governors persuaded the County Nursing 
Officers to call nurses back to work, a strategy that 
worked in some counties (affected two Clinical 
Information Network hospitals), though it was 
disapproved by the Union officials.
 ► 150-day nation-wide nurses’ strike ended after 
agreement8
(CBA was signed later in March 2018)
CBAx, Collective bargaining agreement.
more detail elsewhere).6 Data on paediatric admissions 
were taken from the ongoing CIN surveillance platform 
and for other wards were obtained from the hospitals’ 
health-records departments.
We present a 2-year data pooled from all hospitals on 
the number of admissions per month in the four major 
inpatient wards from January 2016 to December 2017. 
We use the data from January 2014 to December 2015 
for the paediatrics and maternity wards to demonstrate 
annual patterns of admissions and any seasonality that 
might exist.
During both the doctors’ and nurses’ 2017 strikes, there 
were marked reductions in admissions in all the four 
major disciplines—obstetrics, paediatrics, surgical and 
adult medicine (figure 1). Exploration of hospital-spe-
cific data (available on request) demonstrates varied 
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Figure 1 Admissions over time across wards in 13 CIN hospitals. CIN, Clinical Information Network.
responses to the strikes across hospitals and wards. There 
was limited continuing admissions in different hospitals 
in specific wards (maternity (n=1/13), adult medical 
(n=1/13) and surgical (n=1/13)); resumption of services 
before the strikes officially ended (in two maternity wards 
and across all wards in two hospitals) and use of locum 
nurses to keep all the wards open (one hospital). During 
the entire 250 days of the strike, four hospitals had almost 
no admissions at all.
Considering the admissions in the prestrike year 
(December 2015 to November 2016), we speculate that 
a total of 183 170 individuals (including that each mater-
nity admission produced one new-born) did not receive 
admission care in these 13 hospitals during strike year 
(December 2016 to November 2017). This included 
59 965 maternity patients (and the same number of 
newborns), 24 762 medical patients, 20 309 paediatrics 
and 18 169 surgical patients. There are 65 similar level 
referral hospitals in Kenya (Kenya Master Facility List), 
and we tracked data from 13 of these that were part of 
CIN, suggesting that preventable deaths likely occurred 
on a massive scale. Private and faith-based hospitals 
reported increased admissions and mortality over this 
period.7 Typically, county hospitals see many more outpa-
tients than inpatients and so the total number of lost 
episodes of care in the public sector would be consider-
ably higher.
no ‘magIC bulleTS’
There are no ‘magic bullets’ to avert all problems due 
to these strikes in what are complex, politically managed 
and highly professionalised health-sector organisations. 
Where there is a right to health professionals’ indus-
trial strike, appropriate mechanisms are required to 
avert harms. Reactive solutions such as sacking striking 
workers and jailing trade union officials neither address 
the underlying problems nor build resilience of the 
health system.1 5 8 Instead, there is a clear imperative to 
improve the management of HRH and develop proactive 
policies and risk management plans that nurture systems’ 
ability to withstand crises while maintaining functions.9 
Data from the 13 hospitals in the CIN indicate that two of 
the hospitals had 1-day strikes in 2014, seven had strikes 
ranging from 1 to 49 days in 2015, and in 2016 (January to 
November), all hospitals had strikes for periods ranging 
from 27 to 59 days. Such data suggest there were clear 
warning signs of deteriorating relationships that did not 
prompt mitigating actions.
HRH strikes raise a moral dilemma with the poten-
tial of causing harm to patients, violating professional 
ethics and the Hippocratic oath. Yet, HRH strikes may 
be justifiable if there is evidence of long-term benefits to 
the doctors, patients and overall quality of care.10 Impor-
tantly, in Kenya, although the public sector is said to 
provide 48% of all Kenya’s healthcare, it provides a much 
greater proportion of inpatient hospital care particularly 
for the 36.1% (18 million) of Kenya’s population living 
in poverty (Kenya Economic Survey 2018). Strikes thus 
disproportionately affect the poor who are unable to 
afford private sector alternatives. This population there-
fore deserves special ethical consideration when health 
professionals’ strikes are contemplated.
rebuIldIng relaTIonSHIp among STakeHolderS
National and county healthcare leadership need to 
rebuild relationships with professional groups who, in 
turn, need to better define their own professional norms 
and values11 so that, during health system level ‘shocks’ 
professional and societal values might be better aligned. 
Spaces need to be created for all groups to contribute to 
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planning of healthcare and policies that are cognizant of 
economic and social realities spanning training, deploy-
ment of staff, management of performance and defini-
tion of working conditions.12 Such efforts are needed to 
rebuild trust.
Specifically, there needs to be a national and inclu-
sive dialogue (with patient representation) to develop 
minimum operating requirements in the event of strikes 
to prevent the near total collapse of the public health 
system seen in 2017.9 This is especially important as the 
Kenya Constitution permits HRH strikes and also states 
that ‘A person shall not be denied emergency medical 
treatment’.2 Special consideration therefore needs to be 
given to handling of emergencies, ensuring continued 
care of already hospitalised patients and how to safely 
staff vital facilities, such as the emergency rooms, obstetric 
and neonatal departments.13 In some countries, for 
example, senior clinicians continue to give services when 
junior staff are on strike.14 This arrangement provides at 
least some cover while maintaining positive elements of 
an overarching professional ethos. These risk manage-
ment plans are best agreed on outside times of crisis and 
might be enshrined in specific agreements or even in the 
Constitution or Government legislation. Such actions 
need to be taken now.
Going further, a specific forum could be created, 
including senior representatives of all parties, to regu-
larly meet to discuss health system challenges before they 
escalate to strike action. Such a forum may have facili-
tated discussions on the issues raised by the Doctors’ 
Union that were articulated in the 2012 Musyimi Task 
Force Report.15 It could also help in planning how 
best to deliver healthcare in times of natural or other 
hazards (epidemics, natural disasters) and should have 
the opportunity to discuss implementation of major 
proposed health-system reforms such as devolution/
decentralisation of health services. The forum should 
include representatives from national and county govern-
ments, health professional associations and their unions, 
medical teaching institutions, private/faith-based health-
care providers, communities and partners in healthcare 
with an aim to build collaboration among stakeholders. 
As a further precaution, mechanisms for effective, fair 
and independent arbitration should be developed and 
agreed to by all parties in advance of any future strike 
action. Most important is that employers and employees 
should honour agreements made and act in good faith 
for the benefit of the whole population and especially its 
most vulnerable groups.
ConCluSIon
The health professionals’ strikes crippled the health 
services with almost no public hospital inpatient services 
being provided and violating people’s right to healthcare. 
To avoid similar instances in the future, the specific roles 
and responsibilities of the national and county govern-
ments should be clearly defined in a devolved health 
system. Mechanisms should be established for dispute 
resolution, anticipating and pre-empting changes within 
the health system that result to conflict between parties. 
Complexity of health systems should be taken into consid-
eration in problem and solution identification.
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